Craddick's Perverted View of the Texas Constitution

Following the events of Friday night and early Saturday morning, Craddick issued a statement explaining his reasons for not allowing a motion to vacate the chair. (Texas Politics has a copy here.) Craddick cites several provisions of the Texas Constitution, but his analysis, not surprisingly, is flawed.

Craddick first asserts that Article 15, Section 7 of the Texas Constitution “forbids” the removal of a speaker via a motion to vacate the chair.

Here’s the text of Article 15, Section 7:

The Legislature shall provide by law for the trial and removal from office of all officers of this State, the modes for which have not been provided in this Constitution.

Craddick argues that this provision precludes one house of the legislature from removing an officer of the State; both houses must approve such a measure.

The problem is that the speaker is an officer of the House. (Indeed, the first sentence of Craddick’s statement describes the speaker as an “officer of the Texas House.”) House members select one of their own to serve as speaker. Neither the Senate nor the Governor has any formal role in the process.

Further, Article 3, Section 11 governs the removal of representatives (and senators) from office. The House can expel a representative with the consent of two-thirds of the members.

Therefore, if Craddick’s analysis were correct, the House alone could expel the member who happened to be serving as speaker, but the House could not remove that person from the office of speaker--even though the person would no longer be a member of the House--because the House alone couldn’t remove the speaker. Methinks this is absurd.

Article 3, Section 11, by the way, also provides that each house “may determine the rules of its own proceedings.”

Craddick also argues that a motion to vacate is “in essence” an attempt to amend Article 3, Section 9 of the Texas Constitution, which, in Craddick’s words, “governs the timing and authority for the election of the Speaker.”

Article 3, Section 9(b) states that:

The House of Representatives shall, when it first assembles, organize temporarily, and thereupon proceed to the election of a Speaker from its own members.

Thus, the first order of business when House members assemble must be the election of a speaker. Craddick apparently construes this provision as mandating that the election of a speaker can only take place when the House first assembles. Article 3, Section 9, however, does not expressly (or impliedly) prohibit a subsequent speaker’s election.

What if the speaker died during a session (or was expelled from the House)? According to Craddick, Article 3, Section 9 would prohibit the election of a new speaker; the Constitution would only permit the election of a speaker to occur when the House first assembles.

In short, Craddick’s analysis of the relevant constitutional provisions doesn’t even make good nonsense. I haven’t reviewed the pertinent House Rules, but I suspect Craddick’s interpretation of those rules exhibits a similar lack of cogency.